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ABSTARCT
Analysing Negotiated Outcomes: The Dayton Peace Agreement
By
Tijen Tanja Demirel
A thesis presented for the Degree of Master of International Relations 
Bilkent University, August 1997
This study aims to analyse the negotiated outcomes of the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
For this purpose, the study examines three main issues of the agreement, namely the 
territorial issue, the constitutional issue and the issue of Sarajevo, in terms of their 
distributive and integrative aspects. The territorial issue has five and the 
constitutional issue has three sub-issues. In cases where integrative agreements are 
reached, the study examines the type of the mechanisms to reach integrative 
outcomes. These mechanisms are expanding the pie, nonspecific compensation, 
logrolling, cost cutting and bridging. According to the analyses of these negotiated 
outcomes, this thesis reveals that among eight sub-issues and one main issue, the 
negotiated outcomes of five sub-issues and the one main issue are integrative. The 
theoretical, methodological and practical implications of the findings of the analyses 
are further elaborated in this study.
Key words: negotiated outcomes -  integrative outcome -  distributive outcome - 
expanding the pie - nonspecific compensation -  logrolling - cost cutting -  bridging -  
Dayton Peace Agreement
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ÖZET
Müzakere Edilmiş Sonuçların Analizi: Dayton Barış Anlaşması
Tijen Tanja Demirel
Bilkent Üniversitesi, Ağustos 1997
Bu tezin amacı, Dayton Barış Anlaşması’nm müzakere edilmiş sonuçlarının analizini 
yapmaktır. Bu analizi yapmak için anlaşmanın sonuçları, “pazarlıkta kazancı 
bölüştüren sonuçlar” ve “pazarlıkta ortak kazancı arttıran sonuçlar” olmaları 
yönünden İncelenmektedir. Analizler toprak sorunu, anayasal sorun ve Saraybosna 
sorunları üzerinde odaklanmıştır. Toprak sorunu beş, anayasal sorun ise üç alt başlık 
halinde ele alınmıştır. Pazarlıkta ortak kazancı arttıran sonuçların elde edildiği 
durumlarda, bu tür sonuçların elde edilmesinde kullanılan mekanizmalar da bu tezde 
açıklanmıştır. Bu üç müzakere konusunun analizleri sonucunda; toprak sorunu ve 
anayasal sorunun toplam sekiz alt başlığından beş tanesinin, ve Saraybosna 
sorununun pazarlıkta ortak kazancı arttıran sonuçlar olduğu görülmüştür. Ayrıca bu 
bulguların kuramsal, yöntemsel ve pratik çıkarımlarına da bu tezde değinilmiştir.
Anahtar kelimeler: Müzakere edilmiş sonuçlar - pazarlıkta kazancı bölüştüren 
sonuçlar - pazarlıkta ortak kazancı arttıran sonuçlar -  Dayton Barış Anlaşması
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is to analyse the nature of the negotiated outcomes of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. For this purpose, this study investigates the negotiated 
agreements of three issues, namely the territorial issue, the constitutional issue and 
the issue of Sarajevo, in terms of their distributive and integrative aspects. In 
addition, in cases where integrative agreements are reached, the study examines the 
type of the mechanisms to reach integrative outcomes, namely expanding the pie, 
nonspecific compensation, logrolling, cost cutting and bridging.
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
In the framework of the negotiation literature, integrative and distributive bargaining 
deserve emphasis as two important concepts. In 1965, Walton and McKersie, in their 
classical study on labour management negotiations, signified the distinction between
integrative and distributive bargaining in terms of behavioural tradition.' According 
to Walton and McKersie, distributive negotiation is “a hypothetical construct 
referring to the complex system of activities instrumental to the attainment of one 
party’s goal when they are in basic conflict with those of the other party”. Integrative 
bargaining, on the other hand, “refers to the system of activities which is 
instrumental to the attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental conflict 
with those of the other party and which therefore can be integrated”. ‘ According to 
Pruitt, “integrative solutions are those that integrate the two parties’ interests, thereby 
expanding the total available pool of value. They are new and creative alternatives 
that were not under consideration at the beginning of negotiations”.
As the definitions of these two concepts imply, integrative and distributive 
bargaining have been perceived as mutually exclusive processes in the negotiation 
literature. In this context, different authors have created several dual concepts that 
take integrative and distributive bargaining as a starting point."* Fisher and Ury’s 
positional bargaining versus interest bargaining^, Hopmann’s competitive versus 
cooperative bargaining, bargaining versus problem solving^, Lewicki and Litterer’s 
win-lose versus win-win negotiations. Lax and Sebenius’ creating versus claiming 
value are all conceptual variations of integrative and distributive bargaining.^
The literature on integrative negotiation often focuses on the way the parties conduct
the negotiations. For example, Fisher and Ury emphasize the benefits of integrative 
agreements and prescribe how to negotiate in order to reach wise outcomes
o
efficiently and amicably. Accordingly, the basic assumption of the prescriptive 
tradition is that all negotiations have an integrative potential. The important thing is 
that the parties have to know how to switch from a win-lose perceived situation to a 
win-win relationship. When there are multiple issues in question, the parties may 
have different priorities among those issues. In other words, the issue of primary 
concern of one party may be of secondary importance for the other party. Likewise, 
there is the possibility that the rank of these priorities may change through time. 
Thus, an issue that is perceived to be the most essential one by both parties may lose 
its importance for one party in time and the parties can derive an integrative solution 
out of the conflictual situation. Similarly, when parties know each other’s underlying 
interests, goals or needs behind their positions, alternative solutions can be found 
where each party satisfies its underlying interest, goal or need.
There are some laboratory studies in the literature on integrative negotiation, which 
measure the impact of different variables on integrative outcomes. Bottom and 
Studt ,^ Simons'®, Mannix and Bazerman" studied the affect of framing on 
integrative outcome. Likewise, Mannix and Bazerman'^ measured the impact of the 
mobility of negotiators on integrative outcome while Yukl, Malone, Hayslip and 
Pamin'^, Carnevale and Lawler' '^ focused on the affect of time pressure. Thompson'^ 
studied the negotiator’s experience, Kramer and Brewer'® concentrated on ingroup 
identity and lastly. Brewer'^ examined depersonalised trust in terms of their impact
on integrative outcomes.
In the achievement of integrative outcomes, the role of exchange of information is 
crucial because in order to be able to know the other negotiating party’s priorities of 
issues, values and underlying interests, the parties have to have some kind of 
communication. In this respect, problem solving workshops of the field of conflict 
resolution deserve emphasis as they are designed to provide the communication 
between the parties in which they can share information. Problem solving workshops 
are private gatherings where conflicting parties meet with conflict resolution experts 
and try to solve their differences through a pre-structured setting and communication 
provided by these experts.** Burton argues that through a facilitated conflict 
resolution, where there is a third party to assist the interaction by which the parties 
analyse the underlying sources of the conflict, parties to a dispute can overcome their 
problems and reach a win-win solution. For example, when the conflict arises from 
an ontological human need that cannot be compromised, such as identity, security or 
recognition, a win-win outcome is possible if the parties are aware that the fulfilment 
of those needs do not depend on limited resources.Kelman, another prominent 
name of problem solving workshops, goes one step further and states that when 
parties are engaged in such an interactive, explanatory process with the help of an 
unofficial third party acting as a facilitator, parties can transfer this cooperation to the
official negotiations and even to the political level 20
The distinction between integrative and distributive negotiations, which is in its
simplest terms whether to expand the total pool of values available or to divide it, 
reflects itself in the field of international relations in two debates. The first one is the 
debate between the liberal and realist paradigm on relative gain versus absolute gain. 
According to Hopmann, bargainers, or in other words realists, would try to reach an 
agreement at the expense of the other party, even if the agreement is not an optimal 
one. This means that the bargainers would not accept an agreement, which fulfils 
most of their demands but puts the other party in a relatively better off position. In 
such a case, the fulfilled demands, which mean the absolute gains, would not mean 
much to them. The only important thing is to be relatively better off than the other 
side. In contrast, for the problem solvers, or liberals, it is not so important whether 
these demands are equally fulfilled or not. The crucial thing is that both parties are in 
a better position than they were before reaching an agreement. The fact that both
parties have absolutely gained satisfies them.21
The second debate is objective versus subjective conflict. This debate is similar to 
the distinction between the integrative and distributive negotiation situation.^^ Groom 
explains an objective conflict as a zero-sum game, where the gains of one party are 
directly related to the losses of the other. For Groom, however, nearly all conflicts 
are subjective because parties can change their goals, as well as values, and values 
such as security, identity, participation are not at the expense of another. Therefore, 
there are options other than a zero-sum game to resolve the conflict.^^ Likewise, 
Reuck believes that in international relations, conflicts are usually non zero-sum 
because issues such as security or independence are indivisible. More importantly.
values can change and there is never a single value. Thus, conflict resolution should 
mean a discovery process, in which the parties communicate to understand each 
other and find an opportunity to collaborate, which is mutually beneficial. In other 
words, when the parties realize that the conflict is not objective but subjective, they 
can switch from bargaining to problem solving.““*
Although there are numerous researches on integrative outcomes, there are very few 
studies on the types of mechanisms of reaching integrative agreements. The leading 
work on this topic is the study of Rubin, Pruitt and Kim^ .^ They have elaborated five 
basic types of mechanisms to reach such outcomes; which are expanding the pie, 
nonspecific compensation, logrolling, cost cutting and bridging.
1.2 INTEGRATIVE OUTCOMES
1.2.1 EXPANDING THE PIE
In expanding the pie, the conflictual situation is removed by increasing the available 
resources to the conflict while avoiding the need for compromise. In order to solve 
the conflict through expanding the pie, the conflict must arise from a situation in 
which the parties have a demand that is only of limited supply. When additional
resource is provided, the parties’ demands will be met and the parties will be 
satisfied through this additional supply.
This situation can be illustrated by giving an example of a husband and wife who are 
trying to go on a two-week vacation^^. The husband wants to go to the mountains 
whereas the wife wants to go to the seashore. In case of expanding the pie, the couple 
might try to persuade their employers to give two weeks more for a vacation so that 
they can spend two weeks in the mountains and two weeks at the seashore. Thus, 
both the husband and the wife will be satisfied as they get what they want.
1.2.2 NONSPECIFIC COMPENSATION
In nonspecific compensation, while one party gets what it wants, the other party is 
repaid in some unrelated coin. In other words, the loss of the second party that has 
been caused by the satisfaction of the first party’s demand, is compensated for by 
satisfying some unrelated demand of the second party. In order to reach a solution 
where both parties are satisfied, the crucial thing is to know how much value the 
second party loads to the loss caused by the satisfaction of the first party’s demand; 
and how badly the first party is hurt. This kind of information is important for 
providing adequate compensation so that the second party is satisfied.
In the example of the husband and wife, the conflictual situation could be solved by 
nonspecific compensation in the following way: the wife would accept to go to the 
mountains but in return, the husband would spend some of the family resources on 
buying her a new car. The husband, in order to be able to compensate for the loss of 
his wife by not going to the seashore, however, has to know how important it is for 
his wife to get a new car.
1.2.3 LOGROLLING
In logrolling each party satisfies its most important demand by conceding on issues 
that are of relatively low priority to itself but is of high priority to the other party. For 
such a thing to happen, first of all, the parties should not have the same “one and 
only“ demand. In other words, there must be several issues under consideration and 
each party should have different priorities among these issues. Logrolling is then 
possible, when both parties concede on demands that are of lower priority in order to 
get their first priorities. Of course, the first priorities of each party should be different 
in this case.
In order to utilise such a formulation, however, information about the parties’ 
priorities is needed. When one party knows the other’s first priority, then the party 
can compare it with its priority and decide whether to concede or not.
In the case of logrolling, each party is not fully satisfied as they concede, though on 
their lower priorities, still it seems preferable to compromise solutions where they 
might concede on their favourite priority.
Coming to the example of the husband and wife, they can reach an integrative 
solution by considering their primary priorities. Supposing that apart from the 
disagreement over where to go on a vacation, there is a second difference of 
preferences, such as the wife prefers to stay at a first class hotel whereas the husband 
prefers to stay at a tourist home. If accommodation is more important than location 
for the wife and location is more important than accommodation for the husband, 
they can reach an integrative outcome by going to the mountains and staying at a first 
class hotel. By this way, both of the parties satisfy their first priorities.
1.2.4 COST CUTTING
A solution is reached through cost cutting by reducing or eliminating the costs of one 
party while giving the other party what it wants. The emphasis here is to obtain high 
joint benefit not by changing the first party’s position, but by ensuring that the 
second party suffers less.
Cost cutting often takes the form of specific compensation where the loss of the 
conceding party is reduced or eliminated by giving something that satisfies the 
precise values frustrated.
In cost cutting, more information is required compared to the first tliree integrative 
routes above. In order to eliminate or decrease the costs of the conceding party, the 
first party should know the underlying interest of the second party’s position, so that 
an alternative can be found by cost cutting to meet those interests.
For example, if the husband dislikes the beach because of the hustle and bustle, and 
his wife is aware of this, his wife can compensate for his loss by going to the 
seashore by renting a house with a quiet inner courtyard where he can read. Thus, the 
wife can go to the seashore while the husband’s uneasiness is removed to a certain 
extent.
1.2.5 BRIDGING
In bridging, neither party achieves its initial demand but a new alternative is worked 
out that satisfies each party’s interests. The focus in bridging is on the priority of 
interests, not priority of issues. In other words, the important thing is to know why 
the parties have taken their initial positions, what expectations, what interests they
10
have in taking such positions. If the answer is known, a reformulation of the issues is 
possible where each party can satisfy their interests and fulfil their expectations. The 
important thing in bridging is the priority of interests, not the priority of issues as it is 
in logrolling. Obviously, in order to be able to invent such alternatives that could 
meet each party’s underlying interests, a good deal of information is needed.
Concerning the example of husband and wife, when the husband knows that the 
underlying interest of his wife’s demand for going to the seashore is swimming; and 
the wife knows that the underlying interest of her husband’s demand for going to the 
mountains is fishing, these interests can be bridged by going to an inland resort with 
a lake close to woods and streams. The wife can swim in the lake whereas the
husband can fish in the stream.27
1.3 THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
Given the theoretical and conceptual background, the aim of this thesis is to analyse 
the nature of the negotiated outcomes of the three specific issues of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which are the territorial, constitutional and Sarajevo issues. For this 
purpose, this study analyses the negotiated outcomes of these three issues (and their 
sub-issues) in terms of their integrative and distributive aspects. In cases where 
integrative elements are depicted, further analysis is conducted to give a fine-grained
11
picture of the nature of the integrative outcomes. To be more specific, at this stage of 
the analysis, the study focuses on the “type” of the mechanisms to reach integrative 
outcomes, which are namely expanding the pie, nonspecific compensation, 
logrolling, cost cutting and bridging.
As noted before, in the literature of negotiation, numerous studies have been made 
concerning integrative and distributive outcomes. However, what is missing is the 
real world analysis of the international negotiations. Therefore, this thesis aims to fill 
this gap by analysing the negotiated outcomes of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Accordingly, the first chapter of this thesis contains the theoretical and conceptual 
background of integrative and distributive outcomes by referring to the literature on 
negotiation.
The second chapter describes the historical background of the conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in order to give an idea about the beginning of the war, the parties to the 
war and the situation in which the parties were before the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
The description of the Dayton Peace Process ends this chapter.
The third chapter is the analysis chapter, which is also the crux of this study. This 
chapter begins with the presentation of the methodology used to conduct the 
analyses. Then, each sub-issue of the main issues is analysed in terms of the nature of 
their negotiated outcomes.
12
The fourth chapter is the conclusion part. It draws out the theoretical, methodological 
and practical implications of this study.
13
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, established in 1945 was comprised of 
six republics; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and 
Slovenia, and two fully autonomous regions under Serbia; Kosova in the south and 
the Vojvodina in the east ' As a corollary of the escalating nationalist movements 
and ethnic tensions, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from the
'y
Yugoslav Federation on June 25, 1991. Flowever, the federal republic did not 
recognize their independence and this led to clashes between the federal anny (JNA) 
and the republics. Furthermore, towards the end of 1991, Macedonia and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina took concrete steps for independence. On September 8 ,1991, a 
referendum was held in Macedonia, in which a significant majority voted in favour 
of declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. Subsequently, on October 15, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its sovereignty.^
The focus of the war in Yugoslavia shifted to the ethnically complex republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1992. The Muslim-Croat and Serb forces began fighting
14
for assuming the control of strategic areas after the republic declared full 
independence on March 3, 1992.'* On April 27, a new Yugoslav state named the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter FRY) that was comprised of Serbia and 
Montenegro was established.^
The military situation deteriorated rapidly and by mid 1992, the government of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina had already lost the control of most of its territory. In the mean 
time, the Bosnian Serbs besieged the Bosnian capital Sarajevo and left the 
inhabitants of Sarajevo in a situation where they could hardly find food, water and 
medical supplies. Due to heavy fighting, the number of refugees leaving their homes 
increased day by day.
Meanwhile, international concern began to grow as the international community had 
realized how much the situation had deteriorated, and would even be worse as the 
Serbs declared their intention of linking Serbia proper with the Serb enclaves in 
Bosnia and Croatia. The Bosnians, on the other hand, could not defend themselves, 
as they lacked proper arms as a result of the arms embargo imposed by the United 
Nations Security Council against the former Yugoslavia with a view to discouraging 
the breaking way of republics from seceding and thus to prevent the escalation of the 
crisis. The international community tried to escape from the situation of helplessness 
against the ethnic cleansing that was mainly conducted by the Serbs against the 
Muslims, by sending a United Nations (hereafter UN) protection force to be 
deployed in Bosnia. It took the Security Council more than six months to decide on a
15
flight ban over Bosnia with a view to deescalate the fighting and somewhat lessen 
human suffering. Even after the Security Council made up its mind about the ban, the 
Serbs, the only party with an air force, simply flouted the ban four months until the 
Security Council decided to enforce the no-fly zone by asking NATO to deploy some 
squadrons of war planes. ^
Given all these developments the international community launched several peace 
initiatives in order to end the conflict that was deteriorating day by day. The 
European Community (hereafter EC) made the first attempt. According to the EC 
plan, Bosnia-Herzegovina would be divided into three autonomous units along ethnic 
lines, and the territory of each unit would be based on the “national absolute or 
relative majority” in each municipality. This attempt did not produce tangible results 
for peace, and was followed by the second peace initiative, launched this time by the 
UN and the EC. The leaders of the three Bosnian communities attended the 
international conference convened in Geneva from September onwards and chaired 
by the UN representative Cyrus Vance and the EC representative Lord Owen.^ The 
Vance-Owen Peace Plan was based on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten 
provinces within a decentralized state.^ The Vance-Owen mediation effort, however, 
did not bring an agreement to end the conflict.
A second mediation attempt took place under the auspices of the Geneva Conference, 
which was conducted by Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. The Owen- 
Stoltenberg Plan proposed to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into three constituent
16
republics; Croat, Muslim and Serb Republies within a Union of Republics of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina that would be demilitarized.'*^ Although Croatia and Yugoslavia issued 
a joint declaration on January 19, 1994 establishing “the process of the normalization 
of mutual relations”" as a result of this peace initiative, still the Owen-Stoltenberg 
Plan fell short of bringing a comprehensive agreement.
It was a mortar bomb attack launched by the Serbs, killing dozens of civilians in a 
market place in Sarajevo, that made the United States (hereafter US) act decisively in 
this conflict.'^ Talks began on February 26, 1994 on a plan that was strongly backed 
by US for a confederation of Muslim and Croat regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina.'^ 
Indeed, on March 18, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia signed an 
accord that created a federation of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. In addition, 
a further “preliminary agreement on the establishment of a confederation” was linked 
to this federation agreement.
The next attempt was the establishment of a Balkan “Contact Group” in April 1994, 
for the coordination of the international efforts to bring an end to the war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.On May 13, 1994, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and US revealed 
a joint plan urging the parties to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to agree to a four- 
month cease-fire and accept a new partition proposal for Bosnia.'^ According to this 
proposal, the Muslim-Croat Federation would get 51% of Bosnian territory and the 
Bosnian Serbs would get 49% of it. While the Muslim-Croat side favoured this 
proposal, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the 49% proposal as they were then controlling
17
72% of Bosnian land.'^ Nevertheless, the proposal made by the Contact Group for 
the division of Bosnian territory was important, since the 49-51% division was to 
constitute the basis of the new US peace initiative conducted by the US Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs, Richard Holbrooke.
Two critical events happened in the summer of 1995, which made the US take the 
lead for a new peace initiative. The first event was the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa 
into Serb power in July 1995, two UN designated “safe areas”. This demonstrated 
that the situation deteriorated day by day, and neither UN nor the European countries 
were able to do something.'^ The second one was the successful Croatian offensive 
in the Krajina region, which had been under Serb occupation. The military success of 
Croatia led US to think that, the change in balance of power in the region against the 
Bosnian Serbs might pave the way for a quicker diplomatic resolution of the
conflict. 18
Indeed, it was the Dayton Peace Process that produced an agreement bringing an end 
to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the effective mediation of Richard 
Holbrooke.
Richard Holbrooke, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs’^ , 
arrived at Sarajevo in the middle of August 1995 and immediately started the 
mediation process by first meeting with the representatives of each party in order to 
understand the expectations and positions of the parties as well as their reaction to
18
The Bosnian Serb shelling of marketplace in Sarajevo at the end of August shadowed 
the process, however. The market shelling paradoxically accelerated the peace 
process. Though it stopped the negotiations for a while, they were to be resumed 
soon after. Subsequently on August 30, NATO began its air strikes against the 
Bosnian Serbs.^° On the third day of these air raids, the foreign ministers of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and FRY agreed to meet in Geneva to discuss a 
peace settlement. This was a real breakthrough as it had been impossible to get the 
parties into the same room until then. This moderate improvement in the peace 
process reflected itself in the military situation in the sense that NATO suspended its 
air strikes and decided to wait for the consequences of this meeting.^* The Muslim- 
Croat side did not appreciate this decision of NATO and wanted the resumption of 
the NATO air raids. They stated that in case the bombing did not continue, they 
would not attend the peace talks.^  ^ On September 6, NATO decided that Bosnian 
Serbs failed to show their will of complying with the UN demands of removing the 
military threats against Sarajevo and resumed its bombing campaign once again.^^
On September 8, the Geneva Accord was revealed as a consequence of the meeting 
that took place among the foreign ministers of the conflicting parties. In this accord, 
the three parties agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain within its present 
borders as a single state, but would be divided into two entities: the Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb Republic. '^* Although this accord left serious
this peace initiative.
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conflictual issues unresolved, such as the territorial one, it was important in that, that 
it was the first concrete achievement of the peace process.
Shortly after, another achievement was reached thanks to the effective mediation of 
Richard Holbrooke; NATO suspended its air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. In 
return, the Bosnian Serbs would end the siege of Sarajevo and withdraw their heavy 
artillery from around Sarajevo.^^ This deal was followed by a Cease-fire Agreement 
that was reached on October 5, ending the siege of Sarajevo and creating a conducive
environment for the peace talks.26
Meanwhile, on September 26, during the Tripartite Talks in New York, the 
representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and FRY worked out 
the constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, with the New York 
Accord, the constitutional problem was solved to a great extent before the Dayton
Peace Talks began.2 7
On November 1, the US State Secretary Warren Christopher opened the talks in 
Dayton, Ohio.^  ^ These talks proved very difficult as critical problems such as 
territorial division or the composition of the state institutions were negotiated. 
Despite all the odds, the parties, nevertheless, initialled the text of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement documents on November 21^  ^ and signed the Dayton Peace Agreement 
on December 14, 1995 in Paris.^ *^  While Table 1 summarizes the US peace initiative 
mediated by Richard Holbrooke by stating the milestones of the whole process.
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Figure 1 presents the political division in the region.
The next chapter analyses the negotiated outcomes of three issues of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement.
Table 1 : Milestones in the US Peace Process
DATE EVENT
16 A u gu st 1995 The introduction o f  the U S  P eace Plan and the b eg in n in g  o f  the H olbrooke  
m ediation
28  A u gu st 1995 B osnian Serb sh ellin g  o f  a m arket p lace in Sarajevo
3 0  A u gu st 1995 The beginning o f  N A T O  air strikes against B osn ian  Serbs
2 S eptem ber 1995 The suspension  o f  N A T O  air strikes against B osn ian  Serbs
6 S eptem ber 1995 T he resum ption N A T O  air strikes against B osn ian  Serbs
16 S eptem ber 1995 The suspension  o f  N A T O  air strikes against B osn ian  Serbs
2 6  S eptem ber 1995 T he N e w  Y ork A ccord
The constitu tional arrangem ents for B o sn ia -H erzeg o v in a  w ere w ork ed  out.
5 O ctober 1995 The C ease-fire A greem ent
1 N o v em b er  1995 T he beginn ing  o f  the peace  talks in D ayton , O h io
21 N o v em b er  1995 The text o f  the D ayton P eace A g reem en t d ocu m en ts has b een  in itia lled  in 
D ayton.
14 D ecem b er  1995 T he D ayton  P eace A greem en t has been  sig n ed  in Paris.
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Figure 1: The political situation in the Balkans.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS
3.1 METHODOLOGY
This chapter analyses the nature of the negotiated outcomes of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement in terms of the integrative and distributive aspects. Furthermore, it 
elaborates the types of the mechanisms to reach integrative outcomes. The analysis 
focuses on the negotiated outcomes of the three conflictual issues between the 
parties: a) the territorial issue b) the constitutional issue c) the issue of Sarajevo. 
These issues being the three most important ones, were central to negotiations.'
While the issue of Sarajevo has no sub-issue, the territorial issue consists of five sub­
issues, which are (1) the percentage of territory each party would get; (2) control of 
Gorazde and the land link between Sarajevo and Gorazde; (3) Bosnian Serbs access 
to the sea; (4) control of Eastern Slavonia; and (5) the Posavina Corridor and Brcko.
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The constitutional issue comprises of three sub-issues, which are (1) the integrity of 
the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina; (2) political authorities of the state; and (3) the 
name of the state. Table 2 summarizes the three issues and their sub-issues.
As mentioned in Chapter I, distributive outcomes are the ones in which one party’s 
loss is the other party’s win. On the other hand, integrative outcomes refer to 
solutions, which try to reconcile the two parties’ interests and increase the joint 
benefits.^ Again, as noted before, five types of mechanisms for reaching integrative 
agreements are listed in the literature on negotiation: expanding the pie, nonspecific 
compensation, logrolling, cost cutting and bridging. In expanding the pie, the 
conflictual situation is removed by increasing the available resources. In nonspecific 
compensation, one party gets what it wants and the other party is compensated in 
some unrelated coin. In logrolling the parties concede on issues that are of low 
priority to itself but high priority to the other party. In cost cutting, the costs of one 
party are reduced or eliminated, while the other party gets what it wants. Finally, in 
bridging, a new alternative is found that satisfies each party’s underlying interests.^
In order to be able to formulate the negotiated outcomes, according to the five 
mechanisms above, it is necessary to know the positions, underlying interests or 
priorities of the issues of the negotiating parties. In addition, it is essential to know 
the initial position of the negotiating parties and what the parties get at the end of the 
negotiation process. It is only then possible to make a comparison between the initial 
positions and the final achievements and see whether the parties demands are
24
fulfilled or not. This requires systematic treatment of the data. For this purpose, the 
following six questions are formulated and used throughout the analyses:
-What was the issue/sub-issue?
-Who were the negotiating parties to this issue/sub-issue?
-What was each party’s position concerning this issue/sub-issue?
-Why did the parties take such positions concerning this issue/sub-issue; what were 
the underlying interests?
-What were the priorities of each party concerning this issue/sub-issue?
-What did each party get at the end of the peace process?
Answering these questions and therefore treating the data in a systematic way is 
crucial to be able to analyse the mechanisms of reaching an outcome. In case the 
negotiated outcome is a distributive one, the analysis elaborates why it is not 
integrative. If the outcome is an integrative one, then it explains in what kind of a 
formulation the solution fits: expanding the pie, nonspecific compensation, 
logrolling, cost cutting or bridging.
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Table 2 : Sub-issues of the three main issues
ISSUE SUB-ISSUE
T he Territorial Issue
1. T he p ercentage o f  territory each  party w ou ld  get
2. T he control o f  G orazde and the land link betw een  
Sarajevo and G orazde
3. B osn ian  Serb a c c e ss  to  the sea
4. T he control o f  Eastern S la v o n ia
5. T he P osa v in a  Corridor and B rcko
T he C onstitutional Issue
1. T he in tegrity  o f  the state o f  B o sn ia -H erzeg o v in a
2. T he p o litica l authorities o f  the state
3. T he nam e o f  the state
T he Issue o f  Sarajevo
-
3.2 THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE
It was to a great extent the territorial issue, which seemed to be an obstacle to the 
peace process. Although each party continuously made statements concerning their 
demands, they could only reach an outcome at the Dayton Peace Talks, the final 
stage of the peace process.
The territorial issue was complex as a whole, as it included contradictory demands of 
the parties, in the sense that each party had different claims on the same parts of 
territory. The sub-issues were mainly:
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- the percentage of territory each party would get
the control of Gorazde and the land link between Sarajevo and Gorazde 
Bosnian Serb access to the sea 
the control of Eastern Slavonia 
the Posavina Corridor and Brcko
These issues were the ones on which the territorial negotiations had focused on. In 
fact, it was very difficult for each party to give up any square meter of territory of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, as many lives had been lost. Therefore, each single town could 
be an issue in itself during these negotiations. However, on those five problems 
above the parties continuously stated their demands and the negotiations mostly 
concentrated on those five problematic areas.
In the first two problems the negotiating parties were the Muslim-Croat side and the 
Bosnian Serbs. In the problem of Bosnian Serb access to the sea, the negotiating 
parties were the Bosnian Serbs, the Muslim-Croat side and the Republic of Croatia. 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a secondary party as it was involved in this 
problem. Concerning the control of Eastern Slavonia, the parties were the Republic 
of Croatia and the rebel Croatian Serbs. In the problem of the Posavina Corridor and 
Brcko, the negotiating parties were again the Muslim-Croat side and the Bosnian 
Serbs.
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3.2.1 THE PERCENTAGE OF TERRITORY EACH PARTY WOULD GET
3.2.1.1 THE ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The US peace initiative which was unveiled on August 9, 1995'* was based on the 
division of 51% of the territory to the Muslim-Croat side and 49% of the territory to 
the Bosnian Serbs. This division was similar to the proposal made in the Contact 
Group Plan on May 13, 1994  ^which the Muslim-Croat side had agreed to. However, 
the Bosnian Serbs had rejected the 49% proposal, as they had been controlling 70% 
of the country and had military supremacy on the ground.^ The operation launched 
by the Croatian forces in early August to recover the control of the Krajina region 
from the rebel Croatian Serbs who had been holding it since 1992  ^had changed the 
situation. The Bosnian Serbs began losing both territory and supremacy in the 
battlefield. Thus, the Croat offensive created an environment conducive to peace 
negotiations, which would include the redrawing of the map previously proposed by 
the Contact Group on the basis of a 51-49% division.^
As each party explicitly stated their positions in this new peace initiative, the 
Muslim-Croat side said that any peace plan’s demarcation should not be more 
disadvantageous than the plan of the Contact Group; which indicated that the
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percentage of the territory they would control should not be less than 51%. The 
Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, stated that they would consider it “painful” if they 
would get less than 70% of territory as they then controlled 70% of the country. 
Furthermore, they would consider it “unjust”, if they would get less than 64% of
territory. 10
These initial demands changed parallel to the changes in the military situation. At
this point, it is important to note that, the NATO air strikes played a decisive role in
altering the military balance. On August 30, 1995, as a direct response to the
Sarajevo mortar bombing by Bosnian Serbs, NATO launched “Operation Deliberate
Force” and bombed the Bosnian Serb targets.*’ It did not take much time to realize
the effects of this operation. On September 1, the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia,
Croatia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) agreed to hold peace talks in
Geneva.'^ On September 8, the parties agreed on a US brokered agreement, called
• 1 ^the Geneva Accord, which aimed at ending the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Geneva Accord divided the country again on the basis of 49-51%, giving 51% of 
territory to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49% to the Serb entity. This time, the 
Bosnian Serbs did not reject the offer.*"* The NATO air strikes continued while 
giving chance to Muslim-Croat forces to launch offensives and regain their Bosnian 
Serb captured areas. By the middle of September, the Bosnian Serb controlled 
territory had already decreased from 70% to 50%.*  ^ In time, when the Muslim-Croat 
side became sure that Bosnian Serbs got exhausted as they lost Krajina and were still
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losing territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim-Croat side began deviating from 
accepting the 49-51% division.'^ In fact, the US advocated NATO air strikes for 
bringing especially the Serbs to the negotiation table. However, the US also feared 
that further gains of Muslim-Croat side might upset the proposed talks which was 
based on a plan of a nearly even split.'^ On September 20, NATO suspended its 
threat to bomb Bosnian Serb targets and concentrated itself on pressing the Muslim- 
Croat side to stop military offensives in western Bosnia.'*
No matter how the military situation changed the initial demands, the final territorial 
division in the Dayton Agreement gave 49% of the country to the Serb Republic 
while 51% of the country would remain under the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 19
The Muslim-Croat side has achieved more territory than they had controlled during 
the war (with the only exception that after the air strikes they had the chance to 
recapture territory and control 50% of the country). Moreover, they have received 
verbal assurances that the US would provide military equipment and train the 
Muslim-Croat forces needed for their air defense.^" The Bosnian-Serbs, on the other 
hand, accepted 49% of territory which was a percentage below their expectations, but 
had no chance to increase it under the pressure of NATO air strikes, Croatian and 
Bosnian offensives. They rather tried to compensate their quantitative loss with 
gaining qualitatively important territories during the negotiations.^'
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3.2.1.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED OUTCOME
The idea of the division of the Bosnian territory according to the 49-51 % basis was 
imposed on the conflicting parties by third parties. First, the Contact Group 
proposed this division in May 1994, then, the US mediator Richard Holbrooke took 
the 49-51% division of territory as a basis for the new US peace initiative. As a 
result, the Muslim-Croat side got 51% of Bosnian territory and the Bosnian Serbs got 
49% of it, a division that completely supported the proposal of the third parties. In 
other words, the solution that was reached as a result of the peace process seems to 
be an imposition rather than a process where the parties sought for joint benefits. 
Although the Bosnian Serbs had controlled almost 70% of territory at the beginning 
of the peace process, the Croat offensive, and especially the NATO air strikes, gave 
the Muslim-Croat side the chance to recapture Bosnian territory. US, however, had 
“tolerated” the Muslim-Croat territorial regains until the situation on the ground 
resembled the proposal of 49-51% division. When the Muslim-Croat side revealed its 
intention of regaining more than 51% territory, US intervened and pressurized the 
Muslim-Croat side to stop their military offensives. US not only imposed this 
division by implicitly balancing the military situation in accordance with the 49-51 % 
basis, but also gave incentives to the parties such as promising military equipment 
and training to the Muslim-Croat forces that was needed for their own defence.
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As a result, the initial positions of the negotiating parties, whether rigid or flexible, as 
well as the core concerns of the parties in having a higher percentage of Bosnian 
territory had no effect. If the Bosnian territory is considered as a pie, the pie was 
divided on a 49-51% basis, a solution, which is nothing but a compromise. Given this 
information, by remaining specifically within the context of the territorial issue, this 
kind of a solution might be called as a distributive one.
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3.2.2 THE CONTROL OF GORAZDE AND THE LAND CORRIDOR 
BETWEEN SARAJEVO AND GORAZDE
3.2.2.1 THE ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
Gorazde is a town that is located not so far from the Serb border. It is also quite close 
to Sarajevo (see Figure 2). In addition to the strategic position of this town, Gorazde 
became an important issue for the parties as it was the last piece of Muslim held 
territory surrounded by the Bosnian Serbs in eastern Bosnia.^  ^ Thus, the control of 
Gorazde became an integral part of the negotiations concerning the territorial issue.
Since the beginning of the US peace initiative, the Muslim-Croat side continuously 
stated that they would never give up Gorazde. After the middle of September 1995, 
the Muslim-Croat side began pronouncing a land corridor which would connect the 
Muslim enclave of Gorazde with the rest of the Muslim territory. In this way, the 
“blockade” of that town would be lifted.^ '* After a month, Muslim-Croat side stated 
their demand for having a corridor linking Gorazde with Sarajevo.^^ If there would 
be such a corridor, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina could build two or three 
hydroelectric plants which have been previously planned.^^ Thus, the Muslim-Croat 
side wished to have the control of Gorazde and wanted to link Gorazde with the rest 
of their territory to lift the blockade of the city, but specifically link Gorazde with
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Sarajevo to be able to build hydroelectric plants. Both of these demands were 
important for the survival and the development of that city.
Just like the Muslim-Croat side, the Bosnian Serbs also made their demands over 
Gorazde clear at the beginning of the peace process. They wanted Gorazde to 
become a Serb town.^’ First of all, the Bosnian Serbs wanted integral, not 
discontinued territory.“* If Gorazde remained a Muslim town surrounded by Serb 
territory, this would, they claimed, obviously prevent the integrity of Serb territory. 
What is more, Bosnian Serbs wanted to remove the last vestiges of Bosnian Muslim 
community from their borders and Gorazde, a Muslim enclave, should be controlled 
by the Bosnian Serbs.^  ^A more specific reason, however, was that a strategic road 
connecting much of the Bosnian Serb territory in the eastern Bosnia to the coal rich 
region of Bosnia-Herzegovina, runs through Gorazde. The Bosnian Serbs wanted the 
control of that important road.*° Another reason, perhaps a secondary one for 
Bosnian Serb demand for Gorazde was that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also 
wanted Gorazde to remain Bosnian Serb because it was close to Yugoslavia’s 
Sandzac region, where many Muslims lived.*' Therefore, the FRY might have 
wanted to prevent any kind of potential interaction that might arise due to the 
territorial closeness.
Although both parties did not give up their demands over Gorazde, an agreement 
could be reached at the Dayton Peace Talks. According to this agreement, Gorazde 
would remain under the control of the Muslim-Croat side and would be open to
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Sarajevo with a wide corridor, which at its narrowest point was 8 km wide, in 
average 10-15 km wide, sometimes 30 km. This meant that the Muslim-Croat side 
would have a belt of territory wide enough to build the hydroelectric plants. 
Meanwhile, some other territorial arrangements, though territorially unrelated to 
Gorazde, were made. In addition to the Muslim-Croat territories, the Muslim-Croat 
Federation got the previously Serb suburbs to the north and west of Sarajevo, namely 
Ilidza, Hadzici, Ilijas and Vogasca. In this way, all the roads leading to the north and 
south were reopened.^^ The Bosnian Serbs, on the other side, would control Mrkonjic 
Grad, Sipovo, Ozren, Doboj, Modrico, Dervanta, (Bosanski) Brod, Samoc and 
Brcko. Viscgrad, Srebrenica and Zepa would also remain Serb (See Figure 2). 
Especially control of Srebrenica and Zepa deserves emphasis at this critical division 
of territory, as the Muslim-Croat side demanded the return of Srebrenica and Zepa, 
two Muslim strongholds which the Bosnian Serbs had captured in July and still 
remained under Bosnian Serb control For the Muslim-Croat side, these two cities 
were important as the symbols of the Serb slaughter of the Muslim civilians during 
the war. With the loss of these cities both at the battlefield and the negotiation table, 
they were now the symbols of the price of the peace.^^
It is important to state that after this problem was settled in the way above, the 
Bosnian Serbs got full support of the mediators who began to press the Muslim-Croat 
side not to demand more territory and agree on the 49-51% territorial division.
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3.2.2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED OUTCOME
According to the information above, the situation can be summarized in its simplest 
terms as follows. The Muslim-Croat side wanted to have control of Gorazde with a 
land link between Gorazde and Sarajevo. The underlying interest of this demand was 
first of all to lift the “blockade” of Gorazde by linking it to Sarajevo, secondly, to 
build two or three hydroelectric plants on this corridor.
The Bosnian Serbs also wanted Gorazde. They had three underlying interests of 
which the first was to have integral Bosnian Serb territory. The second was that a 
strategic route was running through Gorazde. Finally, the Bosnian Serbs wanted to 
remove the possibility of any connection among the Muslims living in the Sandzac 
region and the Muslims in Gorazde.
As a result, the Muslim-Croat side’s demand was fully satisfied by giving Gorazde to 
the Muslim-Croat Federation with a corridor to Sarajevo wide enough to build the 
hydroelectric plants. This solution can be formulated as nonspecific compensation. In 
nonspecific compensation, one party gets completely what it wants, while the other 
party is compensated for through some unrelated coin. The Muslim-Croat side got 
what it wanted, in return, the Bosnian Serb side was given Srebrenica and Zepa as 
compensation, as well as the support of the mediators on an unrelated issue. 
Especially, the mediators had a crucial role as they had information about how much
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frustrated the Bosnian Serbs were about the Muslim-Croat territorial claims going 
beyond the 49-51% split. The mediators, in addition, were aware of how much value 
the Muslim-Croat side had loaded on Serebrenica and Zepa, and tried to compensate 
the Bosnian Serbs by making the Muslim-Croat side concede these two towns to 
Serbs.
In this case, both parties had the same demand with different core concerns. If the 
parties had different priorities, then, logrolling could be possible by satisfying each 
party’s high priorities, but forcing them to make concessions on issues of low 
priority. However, in this case, as both the Muslim-Croat side and Bosnian Serbs 
wanted Gorazde, such a formulation was not possible.
I'his is not a compromise agreement, either as the Bosnian Serbs were compensated 
for in two ways. First of all, they got the control of Srebrenica and Zepa, two towns 
which the Muslim-Croat side claimed. Secondly, the Bosnian Serbs got full support 
of the mediators in the way of exerting pressure on the Muslim-Croat side to agree 
on the 49-51% territorial division.
This solution does not fit in bridging, because in bridging, a new alternative must be 
created which satisfies the underlying interests of both parties. In this solution, there 
is not such an alternative. This solution refers to neither of the Bosnian Serb 
interests, as it does not prevent the possibility of the relationship between the 
Sandzac Muslims and the Muslims in Gorazde, give the strategic route to the
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Bosnian Serbs or the integrity of the Bosnian Serb territory. However, the result is 
still joint benefit, as the Bosnian Serbs have been compensated for in two unrelated 
issues, and is called nonspecific compensation.
3.2.3 BOSNIAN SERB ACCESS TO THE SEA
3.2.3.1 THE ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
Having access to the sea gives a state many advantages such as transportation, trade 
and tourism. The Bosnian Serbs, while listing their territorial demands since the 
beginning of the peace process, had always emphasized their wish of having access 
to the sea.^  ^The Muslim-Croat side, on the other hand, did not even want to discuss 
the Bosnian Serb access to the sea.^^
For one thing, if the Bosnian Serbs did not gain an outlet to the Adriatic Sea, they 
would be the only entity that did not have any territory on the Adriatic Coast. The 
most probable reason for the Muslim-Croat side to refuse giving any access to the 
sea might have stemmed from enjoying this kind of an advantageous position over 
the Bosnian Serbs. That might be definitely the same reason for the Bosnian Serbs 
for insisting on having an outlet to the sea.
39
In fact, the problem of the Bosnian Serb access to the sea went beyond interesting 
just the Muslim-Croat side and the Bosnian Serbs. At the times when the Bosnian 
Serbs dreamt of uniting with the FRY and form the United Serb Republic, they 
planned to have outlets to the sea; one at Karin, the other at Prevlaka.^* However, the 
Prevlaka Peninsula had been a disputed part of territory between Croatia and 
Yugoslavia^^ and the Serbian access to the sea would require Croatia to give up its 
Prevlaka Peninsula. As the United Serb Republic could not be established, such kind 
of a territorial arrangement was out of question anyway. However, the Bosnian Serbs 
did not cease their demand for reaching the Adriatic Sea from the Prevlaka 
Peninsula. This information might be important for a better understanding of why the 
Bosnian Serbs demanded Prevlaka and how the Croat Republic was incorporated in 
this problem.
In the framework of the Dayton Conference, the Bosnian Serbs brought their demand 
of access to the sea to the agenda. They wanted Croatia to give the FRY the Prevlaka 
Peninsula as compensation for the hinterland of Dubrovnik, which the Croatian 
Army had already occupied before.'**^  The hinterland of Dubrovnik was important for 
the Republic of Croatia for the security of Dubrovnik itself as well as for the safety 
of tourism."” Prevlaka, an area more than 10 hectares, was important as it controlled 
the Bay of Kotor, which contained the FRY’s chief naval base"*^ , but at the same time 
the Republic of Croatia was claiming territorial waters there."^  ^ After such an 
exchange, as the Prevlaka Peninsula belonged to the Montenegrin part of the FRY,
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Montenegro would give the Bosnian Serbs access to the sea from this Peninsula. 
Thus, a tripartite territorial exchange would take place.'*'* During the Dayton 
Conference, the parties did not reach any concrete results and the question of 
Bosnian Serb access to the sea was left to further considerations.'*^ However, the 
Bosnian Serbs claimed that the Republic of Croatia had promised to give up the 
Prevlaka Peninsula in exchange for the hinterland of Dubrovnik during the peace
negotiations.46
When the Dayton Agreement was signed, the territorial arrangement for Dubrovnik 
and Prevlaka did not resemble the proposal above. According to the Dayton 
Agreement, the hinterland of Dubrovnik had been incorporated into the territories of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, in other words, of the Muslim-Croat side. However, 
the Dayton Documents did not mention Prevlaka.'*  ^ Although at the Dayton Talks, 
the parties verbally agreed on a tripartite territorial exchange, Franjo Tudjman, the 
President of Republic of Croatia could not persuade Croatian officials. Croatian 
officials had already been dissatisfied with the issue of Posavina and were against 
giving up the Prevlaka Peninsula. Therefore, when the Dayton Agreement was 
signed in Paris, nothing had been resolved concerning the Prevlaka region, and 
implicitly left Prevlaka as part of Croatian territory.'*  ^In the September 96 Yugoslav- 
Croat Agreement of Normalization of Relations and Recognition, the problem of 
Prevlaka had been left to mutual negotiations.'*^
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3.2.3.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED OUTCOME
In the light of the information above, there seems to be existence of the possibility of 
expanding the pie, but then, a deviation from that possibility.
The Bosnian Serb side wanted to have access to the sea. The Muslim-Croat side was 
against the idea of giving the Bosnian Serbs access to the sea. Thus, the Bosnian 
Serbs brought an alternative solution that incorporated the Republic of Croatia into 
the problem.
According to this alternative the Republic of Croatia would give the Prevlaka 
Peninsula to the FRY, and in return, would get the hinterland of Dubrovnik. Then, 
the Montenegrin part of the FRY would give the Bosnian Serbs access to the sea 
from the Prevlaka Peninsula. Therefore, the Muslim-Croat side would not have to 
concede any territory, the Bosnian Serbs would get access to the sea and the 
Republic of Croatia would get the hinterland of Dubrovnik an area that had 
importance in terms of tourism and security.
This offer increases the available resources to the conflict by incorporating the 
Republic of Croatia to the problem. In this context, the Prevlaka Peninsula was the 
additional resource for it could allow Bosnian Serbs to reach the Adriatic Sea. In this 
way, the Muslim-Croat side would also not be conceding from any territory. Thus,
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both parties’ demands would be met by expanding the pie as the formulation of 
expanding the pie requires the supply of additional resources. What is more, the 
Republic of Croatia, the party actually expanding the pie, would be compensated as 
well.
However, the additional resource itself turned out to be a problem as in the final 
agreement, the Prevlaka Peninsula still remained under the control of the Republic of 
Croatia and the hinterland of Dubrovnik was given to the Muslim-Croat side. 
Accordingly, the Bosnian Serbs did not get an outlet to the sea, the Republic of 
Croatia did not give up the Prevlaka Peninsula, but gave the hinterland of Dubrovnik 
to the Muslim-Croat Federation. Thus, there is not any integrative aspect in this 
solution. At the first instance it seemed as if there was expansion of the pie, but if it 
is true that the Republic of Croatia had promised to give the FRY the Prevlaka 
Peninsula and later had deviated, and still kept the hinterland of Dubrovnik, then 
gave it to the Federation; this might even be exploitation, not any kind of route 
carrying integrative aspects.
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3.2.4 THE CONTROL OF EASTERN SLAVONIA
3.2.4.1 THE ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The only direct territorial problem between the Republic of Croatia and the rebel 
Croatian Serbs was the reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into the legal order of the 
Republic of Croatia. Although Eastern Slavonia was not a part of Bosnia, it was 
important as it was the last area that remained under the “occupation” of the rebel 
Croatian Serbs after the Croatian offensive, which was launched in August in the 
Krajina region.^® The Republic of Croatia wanted this area back, while the rebel
Croatian Serbs wanted to keep it.51
The Republic of Croatia insisted on linking this problem to the peace process in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina due to three important reasons. First of all, the Croats believed 
if the sanctions against the FRY were lifted, there would not be any negotiations on 
the reintegration of this area to the Republic of Croatia any more. The second reason 
was that, there were 80 000 to 90 000 displaced refugees who wanted to return to 
their homes in Eastern Slavonia. Finally, this had been the richest area of the 
Republic of Croatia both industrially and agriculturally, with many factories and 
deposits of crude oil.^  ^Especially, the last reason explains quite clearly why the rebel 
Croatian Serbs did not want to give up Eastern Slavonia so easily.
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The Republic of Croatia was successful in linking this problem to the overall peace 
process. Although there had been no agreement reached at the Geneva meetings 
concerning Eastern Slavonia, the Croats welcomed the approach that this problem 
had been incorporated as a part of the peace solution.^^
The Republic of Croatia showed its determination in reintegrating this area to the 
Republic by threatening to liberate the occupied areas by force, in case no solution 
was found in the peace process. '^' Finally, on November 12, the Republic of Croatia 
and the rebel Croatian Serbs signed an agreement in Dayton concerning the problem 
of Eastern Slavonia. The parties agreed on a 12-month transitional period, which 
could be extended by another year upon the request of the signatories, under UN 
control, before Eastern Slavonia rejoined the Republic of Croatia.^^ With this 
agreement, the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia would be facilitated.
This agreement seems to satisfy the Croatian side while taking territory from the 
rebel Croatian Serbs. However, although there was no indication that the Serb side 
had received in exchange for its endorsement of the agreement, many diplomats in 
the Republic of Croatia said they expected that this agreement included a 
commitment to end sanctions against the FRY.^^
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3.2.4.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED OUTCOME
In this problem, the negotiating parties were the Republic of Croatia and the rebel 
Croatian Serbs. The Republic of Croatia wanted to reintegrate Eastern Slavonia into 
its legal order, as it was at that time under the control of the rebel Croatian Serbs. 
The first underlying interest in reintegrating this area in the context of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement was not to miss the chance of reaching a negotiated solution. 
Secondly, there were Croatian refugees who had their homes in that region. The final 
underlying interest was that this region was oil rich and was developed in terms of 
industry and agriculture.
The rebel Croatian Serbs did not want to give up the control of this region with the 
same underlying interest of possessing this oil rich area that had agricultural and 
industrial productivity. According to this data, it is clear that both parties had an 
underlying interest in common.
The final agreement was a solution that met the demand of the Republic of Croatia 
by giving Eastern Slavonia to this party. This means that the three underlying 
interests of this party were satisfied, while the other party, the rebel Croatian Serbs, 
was left unsatisfied in terms of its underlying interests. If it is not true that the 
agreement included a commitment to end sanctions against the FRY, as the Croatian 
diplomats said, this would mean that the solution is a purely distributive one in which
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the party of the Republic of Croatia has won, and the rebel Croatian Serbs have lost. 
However, if the agreement really included such a commitment, this would signify the 
formulation of nonspecific compensation. In nonspecific compensation one party’s 
total demands are satisfied, while the other party is compensated for its loss with 
some unrelated coin. In this case, the Republic of Croatia got what it wanted, in 
return, the Serbs received compensation in a totally unrelated field. Although the 
demand of the rebel Croatian Serbs was not met, in the sense that they lost Eastern 
Slavonia, another Serb demand, the lifting of sanctions against the FRY, was 
fulfilled. In this context, the rebel Croatian Serbs and the FRY can be considered as 
the same party because the rise against the Croats in Eastern Slavonia was part of the 
expansionist policy of the Serbs aiming to establish the “Greater Serbia”.^  ^ As a 
result, both the Republic of Croatia and the Serbs were satisfied, at least 
theoretically, through nonspecific compensation.
This indicates that any formulation such as logrolling, bridging or cost cutting is not 
possible because there is no exchange of priorities, as well as no satisfaction of 
interests through a new alternative, or reducing costs. Expanding the pie is also not 
an option as there is no supply of an additional resource.
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3.2.5 THE POSA VINA CORRIDOR AND BRCKO
3.2.5.1 THE ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The control of the town Brcko, located at the northern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and the corridor of Posavina running next to Brcko (see Figure 2) remained the only 
territorial problem that could not be solved at Dayton Peace Talks.
The Bosnian Serb demand of "compactness” of territory reflected itself also in the 
problem of Posavina Corridor and the town Brcko. Bosnian Serbs wanted to have 
Brcko for themselves and to widen the corridor of Posavina, which was next to that 
town. The corridor had already been under Bosnian Serb control, but the Bosnian 
Serbs wanted a broader line to connect the eastern and western parts of the Serb 
entity.^  ^The reason for the Bosnian Serbs to widen the corridor from the present 5 
km to 18 km was that they wanted a territorial link wide enough to allow their planes 
to fly from Serbia to Banja Luka, a Bosnian Serb dominated town. Such a demand 
also obviously served for the realization of the compactness of Bosnian territory.^^
On the other hand, the Muslim-Croat side explicitly stated that they would not give 
up Brcko and refused the widening of the corridor.^® For the Muslim-Croat side, just 
the settlement of this problem was important because the functioning of the railway
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from Place to Tuzla would be disturbed as long as this corridor remained 
problematic.^* However, the Muslim-Croat side still did not deviate from rejecting 
the widening of the corridor more than about 3 miles, which then was the actual 
distance between the Muslim-Croat and Bosnian Serb armies.^" The Muslim-Croat 
side also had a concrete reason for not willing to compromise on the control of this 
corridor, as they hoped to cut throughout this strip of land to allow access to the Sava
River on the Croatian border.63
It might be enough to state that the Dayton Peace Talks would almost fail in order to 
explain how both parties were reluctant to compromise in this problem.^“*
As a result, this issue has been left to international arbitration, which would decide 
on the faith of the corridor no later than one year after the peace agreement came into 
force.^  ^ In this way, this problem had been prevented from endangering the whole 
peace agreement.
3.2.5.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED OUTCOME
It is not possible to make an analysis concerning this sub-issue as the solution of this 
sub-issue had been postponed to further negotiation. For the sake of the whole peace 
process, the parties have agreed to solve this sub-issue through international
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arbitration in the future. The parties had maintained their rigid positions and were not 
giving a sign of concession, so that no way was left for any kind of integrative 
solution. Table 3 summarizes types of the negotiated outcomes of each sub-issue of 
the territorial issue.
Table 3 : Types of the negotiated outcomes of the territorial issue and the 
mechanisms used
SUB-ISSUE
TYPE OF THE 
OUTCOME/MECHANISM 
USED
T he percentage o f  territory each  
party w o u ld  get
D istr ib u tive
T he control o f  G orazde and the land  
link b etw een  Sarajevo and G orazde
In teg ra tiv e-n o n sp ecific
co m p en sa tio n
B osn ian  Serb a ccess  to  the sea N o t ap p licab le
T he control o f  Eastern S la v o n ia In teg ra tiv e-n o n sp ecific
co m p en sa tio n
T he P osavin a  Corridor and B rcko N o  ou tco m e
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3.3 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
The Constitutional issue had been the second major issue on which the parties mostly 
negotiated. The Constitutional issue had been a very sensitive one, since it is the 
constitution of a state that establishes and then lays out the functioning of a state. 
Apart from being conscious of the importance of preparing a constitution that would 
establish the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the parties were well aware that this 
constitution would also rule out the fate of each entity. Thus, each party tried to 
impose a constitution that would best serve its entity’s interests. That was the basic 
reason why the negotiations on the constitution were problematic.
There were three main sub-issues in this issue;
- The integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina
- The political authorities of the state
- The name of the state
Nevertheless, such a listing of issues should not give the impression that these sub­
issues were independent from each other. On the contrary, especially the last two 
ones were directly related to the first one; the integrity of the state of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.
Before explaining the three sub-issues above, it is important to sort out the main
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negotiating parties to the constitutional issue. The first main negotiating party was 
the Muslim-Croat side, the other was the Bosnian Serb side. The Republic of Croatia 
and the FRY were secondary parties as they were involved in the issue to the extent 
that it was related to their relations with the entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina; whether 
confederal or not.
3.3.1 THE INTEGRITY OF THE STATE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
3.3.1.1 THE ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
Bosnia-Herzegovina was ethnically composed of three groups: the Bosnian Muslims, 
the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. Thus, it was a difficult task to establish a 
state that would enable all these three ethnic groups to live together peacefully. 
Naturally, at the negotiation table, it was difficult for the parties to talk about living 
peacefully.
Above all, there was the question of integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina: whether there 
would be an integral state called Bosnia-Herzegovina or independent republics, 
which would already mean the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then, there was the 
question of the relations of the ethnic groups with the neighbouring countries of
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. In other words, the extent of the relationship between the 
Bosnian Serbs and the FRY, as well as the relationship between the Bosnian Croats 
and the Republic of Croatia was subject to negotiations in Dayton. As the intensity of 
such relations could have implications for the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, such 
as a further unification of the Bosnian Serbs with the FRY, this problem was 
automatically attached to the problem of integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and had 
been discussed in that context.
The position of the first negotiating party, which the Muslim-Croat side, was in 
favour of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. They wanted a peace solution based on 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.^^ In contrast, the 
second negotiating party, namely the Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, were not in 
favour of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, as their ultimate goal was to establish a 
unitary state for all Serbs.*^  ^The Republic of Croatia aimed at confederating with the 
Muslim-Croat side in order to be able to ensure the protection of Bosnian Croats.^* 
While the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims established a federation on 
March 18, 1994, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims signed a further 
preliminary agreement with the Republic of Croatia, on the establishment of a 
confederation between the newly established federation and the Republic of 
Croatia.However, this confederation could not have been realized and necessary 
steps for creating such a confederation had not been taken until then. Lastly, the FRY 
advocated an outcome that might facilitate some sort of a future union with the 
Bosnian Serbs.’® The reason why the Muslim-Croat side wanted an integral state was
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to prevent the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once an independent Serb Republic 
was established as a consequence of such a partition, the Muslim-Croat side feared 
that this independent republic would unite with the FRY. In fact, the reason for the 
Bosnian Serbs to press for a union of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than a single state, 
and to insist on having the right to establish confederal links, was nothing but a 
verification of the fears of the Muslim-Croat side. The ultimate goal of the Bosnian 
Serb side was to unite with the FRY, and they were now seeking for ways that would 
enable them to fulfil this goal.
As the US peace initiative was introduced to the parties, especially the main parties 
welcomed this initiative, since each party found an aspect that would satisfy their 
interests. First of all, the US Peace Plan was based on the sovereignty and integrity of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina,^' which was exactly what the Muslim-Croat side wanted. 
Secondly, the Bosnian Serbs praised the US initiative as it foresaw the division of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities: the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb 
Republic. Furthermore, they perceived that the US initiative anticipated the 
possibility of a confederal link between the Serb Republic and the FRY.^^
When the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY declared that a joint Bosnian Serb-Yugoslav 
delegation would attend the peace talks, they stated that, this would be a precursor of 
the confederal links between them. For the Muslim-Croat side, however, the most 
sensitive sub-issue was the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina; they could tolerate a 
large degree of autonomy and special ties of the Serb entity and the FRY, but would
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not accept the establishment of a Serb republic or a confederation between the FRY 
and the Serb e n tity T h e y  wanted a unitary Bosnian republic^^
There were two important accords that were decisive in the establishment of the state 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Geneva Accord and the New York Accord/^ At this 
point, especially the Geneva Accord deserves emphasis, as the problem of integrity 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina was solved with this accord to a great extent. According to 
the Geneva Accord, Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a single state within its present 
borders, but divided into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
Serb R epublic.Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s international status as a single state 
within its present borders would be maintained but 51% of its land would be 
controlled by the Federation, composed of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, 
while 49% of its land would be controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. These two entities 
would also have the right to establish parallel special relations with the neighbouring
countries. 79
The Geneva Accord had different implications for the Muslim-Croat side and the 
Bosnian Serbs. For the Muslim-Croat side, the integrity of the state was important 
and with this accord, the notion of a unitary state was preserved. Thus, the dream of 
Greater Serbia was over. The Muslim-Croat side obviously made a concession by 
accepting the Serb entity, but for them, the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into two 
entities signified a division “within” the country, rather than a division “o f’ the 
country.** International recognition belonged to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
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the two entities making up the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina were not internationally 
recognized according to the Geneva Accord. As the Serb Republic was not
ft
independent, such a concession could be tolerated. A second concession the 
Muslim-Croat side had made was the recognition of the “special relationship” 
between the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY. The problem was that, the extent of 
“special relationship” was not specified, but this was going to be worked out and 
solved out at the later stages of the peace process.
For the Bosnian Serbs, the Geneva Accord was important as for the first time, the 
Serb Republic had been officially recognized. In addition, each entity was permitted 
to be self-governing under its own constitution. The Bosnian Serbs and the FRY 
perceived this as a guarantee of independence for the Bosnian Serbs.
After the Geneva Accords, the Bosnian Serbs, the Republic of Croatia and the 
Muslim-Croat side met in New York on September 26, 1995*  ^ and reached an 
agreement on defining the constitutional framework of the state of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. The New York Accords also took the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
as a basis and worked out the details of the constitution of the state as agreed to be 
established in the Geneva Accord.
The Bosnian Serbs continued to insist on having the right to establish confederal 
links with the FRY until the beginning of the Dayton Peace Talks. However, a 
delicate US interference in this problem showed Bosnian Serbs that it was useless to
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claim for confederal links. The US Secretary of State Warren Christopher opened the 
Bosnian peace talks on November 1, 1995, by stating that any peace agreement must 
cover the continued existence of Bosnia as a single state. When this statement was 
coupled with the words of the US mediator Richard Holbrooke, saying that the 
option of confederation would be eliminated, the Bosnian Serbs did not try to resist 
the US support to the Muslim-Croat side any more.^^
As a result, the Dayton Peace Agreement allowed both entities to establish parallel 
links with the neighbouring states in economic, cultural, scientific and other 
spheres.*^ However, these links were limited as such relations should honour the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and any 
agreement on this should be approved by the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina.** 
Furthermore, integration with other states was not permitted.*^
The Muslim-Croat side was satisfied with this kind of a solution, since the state of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina had survived as a unitary state that had full sovereignty with its 
international status and UN membership.^^ The Bosnian Serbs were also satisfied as 
the legal basis for the Serb Republic had been established.^* Concerning the problem 
of having confederal links, the solution that the Dayton Peace Agreement had 
brought about was satisfactory to the Muslim-Croat side, as it had prevented a future 
unification of the Serb Republic with the FRY. The Bosnian Serbs were disappointed 
as they could not establish confederal links with the FRY, but they were still 
satisfied, as they had gained a certain degree of independence.^^
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3.3.1.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED OUTCOME
In this problem, there were three aspects to be taken into consideration: the question 
of integrity, the extent of relations with the neighbouring countries, and the question 
of the Serb entity. The Muslim-Croat side wanted the integrity of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. The underlying interest for the Muslim-Croat side to insist on the 
integrity of the state was to prevent the partition of the state that would ultimately 
allow the Bosnian Serbs to join the FRY, and established the “Greater Serbia”.
For the Bosnian Serbs on the other hand, the most important thing was the 
recognition of a Serb entity. They perceived this as a step for the establishment of a 
unitary state of all Serbs. This was the underlying interest for the Bosnian Serbs 
rejection of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another demand of the Bosnian Serb 
side was to have confederal links with the neighbouring countries. The underlying 
interest of this demand was that such a link between the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY 
would facilitate the further unification of the Serbs.
As both parties had different priorities, it was possible to reach an integrative 
solution by following the route of logrolling. In logrolling, the priority of issues is 
important so that each party can concede on issues that are relatively less important 
to itself but vital for the other party. In this way, both parties’ issues that are of 
relatively high priority are satisfied.
58
In this case, the first priority of the Muslim-Croat side was the integrity of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. The extent of relations with the neighbouring countries and the 
question of Serb entity were of relatively lower priority.
The first priority of the Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, was the recognition of the 
Serb entity. Then came the demand of having confederal links with the neighbouring 
countries not living with in integral state.
Given the priorities of each party, the solution exactly fits in logrolling as the 
primary demand of both parties were satisfied in the following way: the Geneva 
Accord fulfilled the mostly desired demand of the Muslim-Croat side by explicitly 
stating that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a single state within its present borders. 
Likewise, the same accord divided the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities, 
namely the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic, and this time, satisfied 
the primary demand of Bosnian Serbs, which was the recognition of the Serb entity.
For the Muslim-Croat side, it was not easy to accept a Serb entity within the borders 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the Muslim-Croat side could concede on this issue that 
was of relatively lower priority.
Concerning the problem of confederal links, the Dayton Peace Agreement limited the 
relations of these two entities with the neighbouring countries to the level of parallel
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links, not allowing to establish confederal links. While this disappointed the Bosnian 
Serbs side, the Muslim-Croat side was glad, as it was a solution supporting the 
integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
As for the Bosnian Serbs, establishing confederal links was less important than the 
recognition of Serb entity. It was also the same for the issue of integrity. The Bosnian 
Serbs could therefore concede on establishing confederal links and could bear living 
in an integral state for the sake of the recognition of the Serb entity.
It is quite obvious that in this case, the interests were mutually exclusive, in the sense 
that the underlying interest of the demand of one party was completely contradictory 
to the underlying interest of the other. For example, the Bosnian Serb side wanted the 
recognition of a Serb entity as a step for further unification with the FRY, while the 
Muslim-Croat side wanted to have an integral state in order to prevent a future 
unification of the Serbs. In such a context, it is impossible to look for a formulation 
that fits bridging, where the emphasis is on finding a new alternative that satisfies the 
different underlying interests of each party.
It is not cost cutting either, as both parties get a part of their demands. In cost cutting, 
one party receives its demands totally, while the cost of the other party is reduced or 
eliminated. In this case, however, neither party is fully satisfied. Therefore, it can 
also not be compensation as both sides concede. Finally, it is not expanding the pie 
as no additional resources have been supplied to this sub-issue.
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3.3.2 TH E PO LITICA L AU TH O RITIES OF TH E STATE
3.3.2.1 THE ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The difference between the Muslim-Croat orientation towards an integral state and 
the Bosnian Serb orientation towards partition manifested itself in establishing the 
political authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first party, the Muslim-Croat side, 
wanted the creation of a strong central govemment.^^ As the other party, the Bosnian 
Serbs, was seeking for ways of uniting with the FRY, they were not favouring a 
strong central government, which might work effectively and facilitate the 
integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina over time. The Bosnian Serbs feared that such a 
government would prevent the unification of the Serbs in the future.
The Muslim-Croat side wanted a strong government because they thought that strong 
institutions could maintain the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Otherwise, if the 
government structure was to be too loose, the Bosnian Serbs might not integrate with 
the other entity; they might declare its independence and secede from the state of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.^"* Another dimension of the problem was the composition and 
the decision-making system of the governmental institutions that were going to be
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established. The Muslim-Croat side was anxious that the Bosnian Serbs would 
prevent the functioning of the joint institutions of the republic as well as the 
federation, by blocking every process. Thus, they wanted to organise the institutions 
so that the Bosnian Serbs could not block normal life. If the joint institutions would 
not function, one day the Bosnian Serbs might claim that the idea of republic did not 
work, and use this as a justification for secession from the Republic of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Obviously, this would again mean the partition of the country.^^ 
Therefore, the current interest of the Muslim-Croat side was to provide preconditions 
for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The legal precondition had already been 
set out by the Geneva Accord, in which the parties agreed to establish an integral 
state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, the constitutional prerequisites and institutions 
that would enable the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be worked out.^^
On the other hand, the crucial thing for the Bosnian Serbs was the confirmation of 
the existence of the Serb Republic, as well as having equal rights in everything and 
all issues.^^ This was important in order to prevent the integration of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. In case such integration occured, the Bosnian Serbs would not be able 
to realize their dream of uniting with FRY.
The negotiations over the problem of political authorities intensified during the 
tripartite talks in New York. The document called the New York Accord, laid down 
the constitutional principals of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to it, the 
future set-up would involve a parliament or a national assembly, a collective
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presidency and a constitutional court. The members of the parliament and presidency 
would be elected through free and democratic elections that would be held in both 
entities. 2/3 of the members of the parliament or national assembly that had been 
elected would be from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Muslim-Croat 
side), and 1/3 of them from the Serb Republic (Bosnian Serb side). In this parliament 
or assembly, the decisions on any issue would be taken by majority vote, but at least 
1/3 of each entity should back up the decision and vote in favour. The presidency 
would have the same composition, of which 2/3 of its members would be from the 
Federation, and 1/3 of them from the Serb Republic. The decisions would also be 
taken by majority vote. However, if 1/3 of the total members of the presidency 
disagreed with a decision and declared that that decision was destructive of a vital 
interest of the entity or entities, the decision would be referred back to the
appropriate entity’s/entities’ parliament 98
There were especially two aspects of this accord that deserve emphasis concerning 
the satisfaction of each party. The first aspect was the problem of elections. The 
Muslim-Croat side insisted on holding the elections through the system of direct 
elections. They no longer wanted a delegated democracy. However, the Bosnian 
Serbs resisted holding the elections in that way. As a result of the negotiations, both 
sides finally accepted to hold “free and democratic elections”.^  ^ The reason for the 
Muslim-Croat side to insist on direct elections was that if free and democratic 
elections were held through direct vote, the Bosnian Serbs would have the chance to 
bring more rational people in their leadership and remove war criminals.
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Nevertheless, free and democratic elections might not necessarily mean direct voting. 
If one man did not have one vote, as it is the case in the system of direct elections, 
the outcome might completely favour the existing state or regime. According to the 
Muslim-Croat side, such an outcome might lead to suspicion about whether the 
elections reflected the free will of the population or not.*®’ Yet, in the accord, there 
was not any further reference whether direct or indirect elections would be held. 
Only the phrase “free and democratic elections” had been incorporated.
The second aspect was the right to veto, which had been brought by the decision­
making system, both in the parliament or national assembly, and presidency. The 
requirement that at least 1/3 of each entity should back up the decision in the 
parliament or assembly, as well as the necessity that 1/3 of the total members of the 
presidency had to agree with the decisions taken in the presidency, meant that each 
entity had the right to veto any decision. As 2/3 of the members of both the 
parliament or assembly and the presidency were from the Muslim-Croat side, the 
Bosnian Serbs had feared that all the decisions favoured by the Muslim-Croat side 
would pass, and the decisions the Bosnian Serbs favoured would never pass through. 
Thus, such kind of a veto system meant equality and also a constitutional mechanism 
for limiting the supremacy of the Muslim-Croat side, that would arise due to the 
composition of the parliament or assembly. By this way, the Bosnian Serbs felt that 
they had gained complete independence.’®^
The Dayton Peace Agreement did not change the essence of the New York Accord. It
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specified the numbers of the membership of the assembly and presidency, but did not 
alter the decision-making system of those institutions. Thus, the right to veto for each 
entity prevailed. Concerning the elections, there was a minor change in the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, which satisfied the Muslim-Croat side. The members of the 
presidency, the parliaments of the republic and both entities would be elected by 
direct votes. However, the elections would be separate in two entites although the 
Muslim-Croat side wanted joint ones. Still, this was a great achievement for the 
Muslim-Croat side as they gave importance to the election system, as an element for 
reintegration.Apart from that, the Muslim-Croat side found the Dayton Peace 
Agreement satisfactory as it had established institutions for functioning of the state. 
Thus, they had achieved the aim of having a strong central government in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, were satisfied with the solution 
which the Dayton Peace Process had brought to the problem of political authorities, 
as they gained full equality and ensurance to handle their own affairs to the state 
entity independently. In addition, they gained the right to veto, that ensured the
protection of the Serb people. 104
3.3.2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED OUTCOME
In this sub-issue, the problem was whether to have strong political authorities or to 
have a lose state structure. In this context, the composition and decision-making
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system of the government institutions, as well as the elections of the members of 
those institutions were two important aspects on which the problem reflected itself
The first party, the Muslim-Croat side, wanted to have strong political authorities. 
For that reason, they were in favour of establishing state institutions that would 
function properly and would be effective. The underlying interest was to reintegrate 
the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and prevent the eventuality of the secession of the 
Bosnian Serbs, that would be possible in the absence of authority. In this respect, the 
composition of the institutions was also important. The Muslim-Croat side wanted to 
have institutions in which the Bosnian Serbs would not be able to block the decision. 
The underlying interest of this demand was to hinder the Bosnian Serbs from proving 
the inefficiency of the joint institutions, which would be a justification for the 
Bosnian Serbs to establish their own ones. Lastly, the Muslim-Croat side was 
supporting to hold direct elections througout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The underlying 
interest was to give the Bosnian Serbs a chance to elect rational people as a leader 
and remove the war criminals that had secessionist aims.
The Bosnian Serbs on the other hand, wanted to have institutions in which the 
Bosnian Serbs had equal rights with the Muslim-Croat side. The underlying interest 
was to prevent the political suppression of the Bosnian Serbs by the Muslim-Croat 
Federation, which was likely to happen in a parliament in which the Muslim-Croat 
side held the majority. A second underlying interest was to maintain the existance, as 
well as the equality of the Serb entity.
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For the Muslim-Croat side, having strong political authorities had the priority, when 
compared to the elections, composition of the assembly and presidency and their 
decision-making systems. This might stem from the fact that, the Muslim-Croat side 
was a majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, in any democratic system that 
functioned properly, they would not have any problem of not being represented 
fairly. The crucial thing was, however, to have a well-functioning democratic system. 
For this, strong political authorities were needed.
For the Bosnian Serbs, the composition of the assembly and presidency and 
therefore their decision-making system was of primary concern as it was important to 
remove the possibility of the reflections of the Muslim-Croat compositional majority 
on decision-making system. Although they resisted holding direct elections and 
having strong political authorities, they had only secondary importance for the 
Bosnian Serbs.
The solution which the Dayton Peace Agreement brought about fits better to 
logrolling. As stated before in logrolling, each party concedes on issues that are of 
low priority to itself but high priority to the other party. In this problem, the Dayton 
Peace Agreement met the primary demand of the Muslim-Croat side by establishing 
strong political authorities: an assembly, a presidency and a constitutional court. As 
this issue was of relatively low priority for the Bosnian Serbs, they could concede on 
this issue.
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Likewise, the solution fulfilled the primary demand of the Bosnian Serbs by giving a 
veto power to both entities. This veto power satisfied the Bosnian Serbs because it 
removed the disadvantegous situation for the Bosnian Serbs that was likely to arise 
as they were in a minority (1/3) in the parliament and assembly. Although not 
preferable, the Muslim-Croat side could bear giving a veto power to the Bosnian 
Serbs as they had already achieved a goal that was of relatively higher priority.
As for the issue of elections, the Dayton Peace Agreement brought the system of free 
and direct elections. It therefore satisfied the demand that had secondary priority for 
the Muslim-Croat side. However, this did not lead to any dissatisfaction on the 
Bosnian Serb side as this was also an issue for them that was of relatively low 
priority.
In this case, however, it seems crucial to state that the interests of each party were 
not mutually exclusive. Therefore, there is no need for making a distinction between 
the “priority of interests” and “priority of issues”. The primary issues for both parties 
were also the ones in which they had their primary interests. This parallelism 
between the issues and the interests might lead to a confusion regarding this 
formulation, whether it is bridging or logrolling, as bridging focuses on interests and 
logrolling on issues. However, this solution seems to be logrolling as each party got 
what it wanted most, and conceded on things that had secondary importance for 
them. Besides, no new altenative that satisfied both parties’ primary interests had
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been brought, as it should be in bridging. The satisfaction of interests besides the 
fulfillment of the primary issues as a result of the parallelism in this case, is a factor 
that increases joint benefit.
In the solution of this problem, there is not a suffering party as a result of any loss 
caused by the satisfaction of the other party. For this reason, this solution is neither 
cost cutting nor nonspecific compensation. It is also not expanding the pie as there is 
no supply of additional resources.
3.3.3 THE NAME OF THE STATE
3.3.3.1 THE ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
This was not a vital problem but still deserves emphasis, as this problem is a 
reflection of the diversities between the Muslim-Croat side and the Bosnian Serbs 
concerning the integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Since the beginning of the peace process, the Muslim-Croat side stated that Bosnia- 
Herzegovina should remain a republic rather than a u n i o n . O n  the contrary, the
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Bosnian Serbs were against calling the state a “republic” or “union”.
The Muslim-Croat side wanted a republic because this would imply a single state 
with one central authority. In such a context, when the Bosnian Serbs called their 
own entity that was established by the Geneva Accords as Republika Srpska (the 
Serb Republic), the Muslim-Croat side perceived this as a “bitter pill”. However, the 
Muslim-Croat side did not argue over the name because they could not risk losing 
the support of the US. In those days, NATO air strikes over the Bosnian Serb targets 
had put immense pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, and the US had the greatest say in 
the decision of bombing.''*^ This was a concession for the Muslim-Croat side, but not 
“lethal”, as the integrity of the state had still been preserved.
The initial demand of Bosnian Serbs was the division of the country. Therefore, even 
the negotiations over the name of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have much 
relevance for them. They later accepted to call the state “union”, but this was a 
compromise for them. Still, they preferred to call it a “union” rather than a 
“republic”, as a union implies the existence of independent entities that would be 
united by a looser kind of superstructure.'®’
Finally, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, established by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, was called the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The republic would be 
composed of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was the Muslim-Croat 
entity, and the Republika Srpska, namely the Bosnian Serb entity. The name of the
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state what the Muslim-Croat side wanted, and the name of the Bosnian Serb entity 
was what the Bosnian Serbs wanted.
3.3.3.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED OUTCOME
The problem of the name of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be separated 
from the problem of integrity. The Muslim-Croat side wanted to have an integral 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and therefore, preferred that the state would have a name such 
as “the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina”. The underlying interest was to keep the 
integrity of the state in order to prevent the secession of the Bosnian Serbs.
The Bosnian Serb side, on the other hand, was against an integral state, and preferred 
that the name of the state would include the word “union”, implying the existence of 
the Serb entity. Their core concern was the recognition of a Serb entity within the 
state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would be a step for the ultimate unification of 
the Serbs.
Given the demands of both parties and their underlying interests, the solution can be 
formulated as cost cutting. In cost cutting, one party gets completely what it wants, 
while the loss of the other side is reduced or eliminated. In this problem, the 
establishment of Republika Srpska has met the Bosnian Serb demand of official
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recognition. As the Muslim-Croat side was against the establishment of a Serb entity, 
naming the newly established state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina compensated this loss. This is not nonspecific compensation as 
the loss of the Muslim-Croat side is reduced through a related issue. The crucial 
point is that, the underlying interest of both the integrity of the state and the name 
issue was the same. In that way, the frustration of the Muslim-Croat side caused by 
the recognition of the Serb entity -  as the recognition contradicted the integrity of the 
state -  was tried to be reduced by giving a name to the state which implied integrity.
An important point is that, the recognition of the Bosnian Serb entity appears in two 
of the sub- issues; the problem of integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
the name of the state. This indicates that the concession made by the Muslim-Croat 
side concerning this problem has also been dealt with, by reducing the loss through 
cost cutting in the name issue, and satisfying another issue through logrolling.
Table 4 summarizes types of the negotiated outcomes of each sub-issue of the 
constitutional issue.
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Table 4 : Types of the negotiated outcomes of the constitutional issue and the 
mechanisms used
SUB-ISSUE TYPE OF THE
OUTCOME / MECHANISM USED
T he integrity o f  the state o f  B o sn ia -H erzeg o v in a In tegrative-logro llin g
T he politica l authorities o f  the state In tegrative-logro llin g
T he nam e o f  the state In tegrative-cost cutting
3.4 THE ISSUE OF SARAJEVO
3.4.1 THE ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The issue of Sarajevo had been the third major issue on whieh the parties had 
divergent positions. Although this issue was not so complicated when compared to 
the territorial and constitutional issues in the sense that it did not have several 
aspects, still, the issue of Sarajevo constituted an important part of the negotiations. 
At the first glance, this issue might seem to be an integral part of the territorial issue. 
Nevertheless, the parties perceived Sarajevo not only as a part of territory, but as the
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capital city of the Bosnian State, that had been under siege since May 1992.'°* The 
divergent positions each party had taken and the reasons for taking such positions 
constituted an issue in itself other than the territorial one.
The problem concerning Sarajevo was, whether the city would remain under the 
complete control of the Muslim-Croat side, or would be divided between the Bosnian 
Serb side and Muslim-Croat side. Thus, there were two parties to this issue; the 
Muslim-Croat side and the Bosnian Serb side. The Muslim-Croat side wanted an 
undivided Sarajevo that would be under their control ,whi le  the Bosnian Serbs 
wanted to control at least a part of Sarajevo, where Serbs had been in majority."®
Apart from these demands, there was a military aspect concerning Sarajevo, which in 
fact integrated into the issue and effected the positions of the parties. After Bosnia- 
Herzegovina declared full independence on March 3, 1992, heavy fighting began in 
the Bosnian capital city, Sarajevo. The situation exacerbated when the inhabitants of 
Sarajevo could not get food, water and medical supplies because of the tight siege of 
Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs.*" The city had still been under the Bosnian Serb 
siege when the US peace initiative had been introduced. In the meantime, on May 6, 
1993, with the UN Security Council Resolution 824, Sarajevo had become a “safe 
area”, together with the towns of Tuzla, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac. Safe 
area meant that all the parties concerned had to ensure that those areas had been free 
from armed attack or any other hostile acts."^ However, in August 1995,when the 
US peace plan had been introduced, the Muslim-Croat side explicitly stated that they
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did not want Sarajevo to be administered by UN after what had happened to 
Srebrenica and Zepa. These two towns had also been safe areas under UN 
protection but Bosnian Serbs had overrun these towns in July 1995.*''  ^This was the 
situation of Sarajevo in August 1995, and the fate of the city had still been unclear 
when the negotiations began.
The Muslim-Croat side did not have to wait so long to see that their concerns about 
the security of Sarajevo as a safe area had been verified. At the end of August, the 
Bosnian Serbs shelled a market place in Sarajevo and had killed many civilians.'*^ 
The immediate reaction that came from the Muslim-Croat side was in the form of 
putting a condition to the peace negotiations, by stating that, they would suspend 
participation in the peace process unless the Bosnian Serbs had been punished for the 
shelling of Sarajevo."^ On August 30, NATO began its air strikes against the 
Bosnian Serbs as retaliation over the shelling of Sarajevo, also with the hope to push 
the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table and to break the siege of Sarajevo."^ On 
September 1, the foreign ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have agreed to meet in Geneva to discuss a 
peace settlement. Meanwhile, NATO suspended its air strikes and waited to see the 
results of the negotiations. However, the Muslim-Croat side did not welcome this 
decision of NATO and stated that, if the NATO bombing would not resume, they 
would not attend the t a l ks . 'A f te r  a couple of days, NATO indeed resumed 
bombing, by concluding that the Bosnian Serbs had failed to demonstrate the intent 
to comply with the UN demands of removing military threats against Sarajevo.'^®
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This might seem as if the Western Alliance was taking sides in favour of the Muslim- 
Croat side; but since the beginning of the war in Bosnia, the Western Alliance had 
not been able to end the war, or at least prevent the escalation of the war, as they had 
refrained from taking a tougher stance. The stated aim of the Western Alliance for 
bombing the Bosnian Serb targets was to bring the parties to the negotiation table 
and end the war by bringing a negotiated solution. In this way, the Western Alliance 
could also free itself from the humiliation of not ending the war. The only way that 
seemed possible to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table was to exhaust 
them by those air raids. Therefore, even if this might be perceived as taking sides, it 
was in fact a taking side through the coincidence of the positions of the Muslim- 
Croat side and the Western Alliance.
Afterwards, in Geneva, the parties clearly stated their demands for Sarajevo. The 
Muslim-Croat side insisted on a unified Sarajevo, and the Bosnian Serbs did not 
give up their demand of controlling a part of Sa r a j e vo .Th e  Bosnian Serbs also 
revealed that they were ready to lift the blockade of Sarajevo and discuss a cease-fire 
with the Muslim-Croat forces, but they refused to withdraw siege guns under attack 
by NATO planes. On September 13, when the Bosnian Serbs expressed their wish 
to have the air strikes lifted, Richard Holbrooke assured the Bosnian Serbs that they 
would stop the strikes, if the Bosnian Serbs would end the siege of Sa r a j evo .The  
agreement, as an outcome of this deal, would led to a cease-fire by ending the siege 
of Sarajevo in return for halting the air strikes, and would create an atmosphere 
conducive for taking concrete steps for a negotiated s o l u t i o n . T h e  peace talks
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began in US at the beginning of November, after a cease-fire agreement had been 
signed on October 5, which was the realisation of the deal above.
Now that the siege of Sarajevo had ended, the question in the peace talks was 
whether Sarajevo would be unified and totally under the control of the Muslim-Croat 
side, or be divided among the Bosnian Serb side and the Muslim-Croat side.
The Muslim-Croat side wanted Sarajevo and the urban parts of the city, which 
included the areas making possible most importantly all communications between 
Sarajevo and the north, and the communication lines to the south, including the 
railway junction and the a i rp o r t . I n  addition, they wanted a unified city as it would 
be difficult to keep peace in Sarajevo if it would be divided among hostile
factions. 128
The Bosnian Serbs on the other hand, did not want to give up Sarajevo as it was the 
second Serb city in the former Yugoslavia and many Bosnian Serbs were living in 
Sa ra j evo .The  Bosnian Serbs wanted a divided Sarajevo as a symbol of legitimacy 
of their state within Bosnia-Herzegovina.'^'^ The problem was no longer the 
territorial division of Sarajevo, but the constitutional and the legal status of the city.
that would determine the side having authority over Sarajevo. 131
As a result, according to the Dayton Peace Agreement, central Sarajevo and some 
surrounding territory, including Grbovica and Ilizda, would be under the control of
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the Muslim-Croat Federation, while the Bosnian Serbs would control other districts. 
The Bosnian Serbs also would retain nearby Pale, which was their provisional 
c a p i t a l . N o t  surprisingly, the Muslim-Croat side was fully satisfied with that 
solution, as they got Sarajevo together with its surroundings under their control.
For the Bosnian Serbs, however, Sarajevo was a painful loss and they had some 
reservations about this solution. The Bosnian Serbs thought that Sarajevo would be a 
problem, as 130 000-150 000 Serbs, living in Sarajevo, would either have to leave 
their homes or stay and defend t hemse lve s . In  other words, the Bosnian Serb side 
was anxious about the future of the Bosnian Serb majority living in Sarajevo, and 
they were deeply unsatisfied with the loss of the city. However, the Dayton Peace 
Agreement had addressed to these concerns of the Bosnian Serbs. Accordingly, the 
Bosnian Serbs had received guarantees regarding reconstruction and building from 
the international community and the FRY for those people who wanted to leave. For 
those people who wanted to stay, again, they received international guarantee 
regarding protection. The people in Serb Sarajevo would have security in the sense 
that they would know that they did not have to leave and they would have a choice in 
the sense that they would have somewhere to go, if they wanted to leave. As a 
result, the third major issue of the peace process had been solved in this way.
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3.4.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED OUTCOME
Concerning the issue of Sarajevo, both parties had mutually exclusive demands, but 
different underlying interests. First of all, the Muslim-Croat side wanted to have an 
undivided Sarajevo under its control, while the Bosnian Serbs wanted to control a 
part of Sarajevo.
The underlying interest of the Muslim-Croat side was to have this area, which was 
developed in terms of communication and transportation. Secondly, they wanted a 
unified city, as a division of the city among hostile factions would create problems.
However, the underlying interest of the Bosnian Serb side was quite different. The 
Bosnian Serb side was concerned about the future of the Serb majority living in 
Sarajevo. In addition, if they would have a part of Sarajevo, this would be an 
indication for the legitimacy of their state within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The solution, which the Dayton Peace Agreement has brought can be formulated as 
nonspecific compensation. In nonspecific compensation, one party gets what it wants 
and the other party is compensated in some unrelated coin. Concerning the issue of 
Sarajevo, the outcome completely satisfied the Muslim-Croat demand and 
compensated the loss of the Bosnian Serb side. Accordingly, Sarajevo remained 
under the control of the Muslim-Croat Federation and would be undivided. In return.
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the Bosnian Serb side got some districts of Sarajevo and also Pale, the provisional 
capital city of the Bosnian Serbs. Although the Bosnian Serbs did not have the same 
underlying interest for the districts of Sarajevo and Pale, still they were important 
areas for the Bosnian Serbs, that would compensate the loss of Sarajevo to a certain 
extent. In addition, the Bosnian Serbs had received guarantees concerning the rights 
of the Serb majority living in Sarajevo. This can be formulated as cost cutting 
because the frustration of the Bosnian Serbs caused by the loss of the city was 
reduced through these guarantees.
This solution does not fit in logrolling because the Muslim-Croat side did not 
concede on any issue. It is also not bridging, as there was not a new alternative that 
satisfied the interests of both parties. Lastly, it was not expanding the pie, as there 
was no supply of resources to the conflict. Table 5 summarizes the type of the 
negotiated outcome of the issue of Sarajevo.
Table 5 : Type of the negotiated outcome of the issue of Sarajevo and the 
mechanism used
ISSUE TYPE OF THE OUTCOME / 
MECHANISM USED
S a ra jev o In teg ra tiv e -n o n sp ec ific  co m p en sa tio n , c o s t  cu ttin g
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The next chapter, the conclusion part, consists of the major findings and the 
theoretical, methodological and practical implications that can be drawn out of this 
study.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The analyses in the previous chapter revealed that among the eight sub-issues and 
one main issue, the negotiated outcomes of the five sub-issues and the one main issue 
were integrative. In two of these sub-issues and in the main issue (the control of 
Gorazde and the land link between Sarajevo and Gorazde, the control of Eastern 
Slavonia, the issue of Sarajevo), nonspecific compensation was used as the 
mechanism to reach integrative outcomes. In two sub-issues (the integrity of the state 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the political authorities of the state), logrolling was used. 
Finally, in one sub-issue and the main issue (the name of the state, issue of Sarajevo), 
cost cutting was used to reach integrative outcomes. There were no integrative 
outcomes where bridging or expanding the pie were used as the mechanism. Among 
the remaining three sub-issues, only the negotiated outcome of one sub-issue (the 
percentage of territory each party would get) was distributive. Apart from that, one 
sub-issue (Posavina Corridor and Brcko) was left to international arbitration. For one 
other sub-issue (Bosnian Serb access to the sea), it was not possible to analyse the 
negotiated outcome in terms of its distributive or integrative aspects due to the
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ambiguity of the outcome itself (See Appendix).
These findings are unexpected, therefore striking because this study showed that 
even in the real world international negotiations, the achievement of integrative 
outcome is possible. Below, this chapter further elaborates the theoretical, 
methodological and practical implications of this study.
4.1 THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Concerning the theoretical implications, it is necessary to state that there are 
numerous studies in the negotiation literature, which refer to integrative and 
distributive negotiation and outcomes. However, there are very few studies which 
concentrate on the distributive and integrative aspects of the real world international 
negotiations. Therefore, this study applied the theory of negotiations to the real world 
case (Dayton Peace Agreement) in order to examine whether in the real world 
negotiations integrative agreements are possible.
This leads to another theoretical implication. As Hopmann emphasizes, the realist 
paradigm is dominant in international relations.' According to this paradigm, the gain 
of one party is the loss of the other party. At this point, this thesis challenged this 
realist assumption by showing that there might be integrative outcomes in the real
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world negotiations. The finding that some negotiated outcomes of the Dayton Peace 
Agreements were integrative, as the analysis part indicated, supported this attempt. It 
is necessary to note that the Dayton Peace Agreement is not a cooperation 
agreement, not a customs union agreement, nor an agreement that updates an already 
existing one, in all of which an extent of relationship has already been established. 
On the contrary, the negotiating parties in the Dayton Peace Process were the sides of 
a bloody war. In other words, the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the 
Bosnian War, can be called as the manifestation of the realist paradigm in the real 
world. The analyses of this study showed that even in that kind of an agreement, 
numerous integrative outcomes are present on issue basis.
A final remark in terms of the theoretical implications is that the five mechanisms 
suggested to reach integrative outcomes, which were used as tools for analysis, have 
distributive aspects as well. In expanding the pie, the resources are increased, but 
then redistributed. In nonspecific compensation, redistribution occurs between the 
demanded and compensated interests. In other words, while one party gets what it 
wants, the other party is compensated. How much compensation the other party 
would get and when is a matter of distribution. In logrolling, there is a distribution 
among the issues as well. Each party has a rank of issues according to their priorities, 
and each party gets what is primarily important for it and concedes on less important 
issues. Thus, there is a distribution among priority of issues. In cost cutting, there is 
the same kind of distribution as indicates of nonspecific compensation. One party 
gets what it wants while the cost of the other party is reduced or eliminated.
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Therefore, there is a distribution between the demand and the reduced cost. The point 
is that a party is satisfied either by fulfilling is demand or by reducing its costs. 
Finally, in bridging, there is a distribution among interests as a new alternative is 
found that satisfies both sides’ primary interests. The distribution is between the 
interests this time, because instead of fulfilling all interests, both parties’ primary 
interests are met. What is common to all these five mechanisms is that they are 
mechanisms, which aim to increase the joint benefit and satisfaction of each party as 
much as possible.
4.2 THE METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
In terms of methodological implications, the first point is that, as there are few real 
world analyses in international negotiations, there is also not enough guidance and 
instruments about how to conduct such study. Therefore, in this thesis, the six 
questions (what was the issue/sub-issue, who were the parties to this issue/sub-issue, 
what was each party’s position concerning this issue/sub-issue, why did the parties 
take such positions concerning this issue/sub-issue, what were the underlying 
interests and the priorities of each party concerning this issue/sub-issue, what that 
each party get at the end of the peace process) served as analytical tools to 
understand and identify the major parameters of the negotiations. By this way, the 
primary data have been transformed systematically to a form which turned out to be
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the bases of the analyses.
An important limitation of this methodology was the difficulty in learning the value 
each party attaches to a specific issue/sub-issue as well as the underlying interests of 
each party’s position. To put it in another way, it may not always be possible to 
answer the fourth question above by using the sources of news agencies. In order to 
be able to answer the fourth question, the thesis relied on inferences that were based 
on the information gathered from the news agencies. For overcoming this limitation, 
it might be useful to be able to interview the negotiators themselves who are the best 
persons to know the underlying interests of their positions. However, this is a very 
costly method of gathering information.
Another way that would help to reveal the underlying interests is referring to the 
records of the negotiations and relevant documents of the agreement. This is also not 
possible for the time being as the Dayton Peace Agreement is a recent agreement and 
refers to a hot conflict. Therefore, the documents are still secret.
Apart from these methodological limitations, there is the problem of the lack of an 
instrument to analyse negotiated outcomes. Although there are content analysis codes 
concerning the negotiation process, these do not give any idea about the nature of the 
outcomes of those negotiations. Thus, drawing inferences seems to be the only way 
to make a real world analysis, at least for the time being. In this context, this thesis 
showed the limitations of a real world analysis and therefore, implying the necessity
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of an instrument, for example content analysis code concerning the nature of the 
outcomes of negotiations. Further analysis of real world conflicts would be helpful in 
developing such a content analysis code.
Another important point that deserves emphasis is that this thesis analysed the 
Dayton Peace Agreement at the issue and sub-issue level. It dwelled on each 
issue/sub-issue and went to a formulation only at that level. For example, it did not 
make a formulation by taking the territorial and constitutional issues into 
consideration at the same time, but analysed the each sub-issue of the territorial and 
constitutional issue in itself and made a formulation for each of those sub-issues. In 
other words, it remained at the micro level. Therefore, it is also not within the scope 
of this thesis to state whether the Dayton Peace Agreement is integrative or not as a 
whole. In order to be able to draw a conclusion concerning the whole agreement, it is 
essential to take a macro approach, which formulates the negotiated outcome of the 
agreement, by taking all issues into consideration at the same time. The only thing 
this study might imply at a macro level is that this agreement, more or less, is 
designed to satisfy each of the negotiating parties in terms of the three issues that are 
subject to this study.
Remaining at the level of issue/sub-issue, although the analysis showed that the 
negotiated outcomes of numerous sub-issues concerning the territorial and 
constitutional issues and of the issue of Sarajevo were integrative outcomes that 
theoretically increased mutual benefits, with this kind of a study, it was not possible
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to measure how much the parties increased their joint benefits.
4.3 THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
As for the practical implications, the analysis on the Dayton Peace Agreement 
indicates that reaching integrative outcomes does not require the parties to leave their 
own interests aside and only try to think in terms of increasing the other party’s 
interests. The mechanisms for reaching integrative outcomes show the parties how to 
increase their own interests as well. Therefore, it is important to train the negotiating 
parties in order to make them able to find formulations where they can increase their 
own interests together with the interests of the other party. However, there is a 
limitation at this point, in the sense that, as every integrative outcome has a 
distributive aspect as stated above, it is up to the parties to decide on the degree of 
each of these aspects.
The role of the mediator is also an important point concerning the practical 
implications. The achievement of integrative outcomes depends to a great extent on 
the availability of extra information and extra resources. A third party who has a 
good picture of events, leverage and the possibility to provide extra resources as well 
as extra information about parties, is more likely to be successful in the achievement 
of an integrative outcome.
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Table showing the major findings
M E C H A N I S M S  U S E D  T O  R E A C H  I N T E G R A T I V E  O U T C O M E S
C/5
u
P
C/5
1
CQ
D
C/3
E x p a n d in g  the p ie N o n sp e c if ic
co m p en sa tio n
L o g r o llin g C o st cu tting B ridging N o  o u tco m e N .A D istr ib u tiv e
T h e  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  terr itory  
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